On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict

Francesco Caselli () and John Coleman ()

CEP Discussion Papers from Centre for Economic Performance, LSE

Abstract: We present a theory of ethnic conflict in which coalitions formed along ethnic lines competefor the economy's resources. The role of ethnicity is to enforce coalition membership: inethnically homogeneous societies members of the losing coalition can defect to the winners atlow cost, and this rules out conflict as an equilibrium outcome. We derive a number ofimplications of the model relating social, political, and economic indicators such as theincidence of conflict, the distance among ethnic groups, group sizes, income inequality, andexpropriable resources.

Keywords: ethnic distance; exploitation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: P48 Q34 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-afr, nep-pol and nep-soc
Date: Written
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Related works:
Working Paper: On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict (2006)
Working Paper: On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict (2006)
Working Paper: On the Theory of Ethnic Conflict (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:cepdps:dp0732

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