Just Rewards?Local Politics and Public ResourceAllocation in South India

Timothy Besley (), Rohini Pande and Vijayendra Rao

STICERD - Development Economics Papers from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: This paper uses data on elected village councils in South India to examine thepolitical economy of public resource allocation. We find that the pattern ofpolicy-making reflects politicians' self-interest. Elected councillors benefit fromimproved personal access to public resources. In addition, the headcouncillor's group identity and residence influences public resource allocation.While electoral incentives do not eliminate politician opportunism, votersappear able to use their electoral clout to gain greater access to publicresources.

Keywords: decentralization; India; Panchayat. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H76 H11 O12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-cwa, nep-dev, nep-pbe and nep-pol
Date: 2007-10
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stidep:49

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