Implementation and Renegotiation - (Now published in Review of Economic Studies, vol.66 (1), 1999, pp.39-56.)

Eric S. Maskin and John Moore

STICERD - Theoretical Economics Paper Series from Suntory and Toyota International Centres for Economics and Related Disciplines, LSE

Abstract: The paper characterises the choice rules that can be implemented when agents are unable to commit themselves not to renegotiate the mechanism.

Keywords: social choice rule; implementation; renegotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-12
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cep:stitep:366

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