Fool the Markets? Creative Accounting, Fiscal Transparency and Sovereign Risk Premia

Kerstin Bernoth () and Guntram Wolff

No CESifo Working Paper No. 1732, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: We investigate the effects of official fiscal data and creative accounting signals on interest rate spreads between bond yields in the European Union. Our model predicts that risk premia contained in government bond spreads should increase in both the official fiscal position and the expected “creative” part of fiscal policy. The relative importance of these two signals depends on the transparency of the country. Greater transparency reduces risk premia. The empirical results confirm the hypotheses. Creative accounting increases the spread. The increase of the risk premium is stronger if financial markets are unsure about the true extent of creative accounting. Fiscal transparency reduces risk premia.

Keywords: risk premia; government bond yields; creative accounting; stock-flow adjustments; gimmickry; transparency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E43 E62 F34 G12 H60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin, nep-fmk, nep-mac, nep-mst and nep-pbe
Date: 2006
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Related works:
Working Paper: Fool the markets? Creative accounting, fiscal transparency and sovereign risk premia (2006)
Working Paper: Fool the markets? Creative accounting, fiscal transparency and sovereign risk premia (2006)
Journal Article: FOOL THE MARKETS? CREATIVE ACCOUNTING, FISCAL TRANSPARENCY AND SOVEREIGN RISK PREMIA (2008)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1732

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