Bureaucrats or Politicians?

Alberto Alesina () and Guido Tabellini ()

No CESifo Working Paper No. 1130, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates the criteria that should lead a society to allocate policy tasks to elected policymakers (politicians) or non elected bureaucrats. Politicians are preferable for tasks that do not involve too much specific technical ability relative to effort; there is uncertainty about ex post preferences of the public and flexibility is valuable; time inconsistency is not an issue; small but powerful vested interests do not have large stakes in the policy outcome; effective decisions over policies require taking into account policy complementarities and compensating the losers. We then compare this normative benchmark with the case in which politicians choose when to delegate and we show that the two generally differ.

Keywords: politics; delegation; bureaucracies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lam and nep-pol
Date: 2004
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Related works:
Working Paper: Bureaucrats or Politicians? (2003)
Working Paper: Bureaucrats or Politicians? (2005)
Working Paper: Bureaucrats or Politicians? (2004)
Working Paper: Bureaucrats or Politicians? (2003)
Working Paper: Bureaucrats or Politicians? (2004)
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