Immediate Demand Reduction in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions

Frank Riedel () and Elmar Wolfstetter ()

No CESifo Working Paper No. 1315, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: The present note analyzes the Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auction with arbitrarily many bidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that the game is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficient allocation assigns at least one unit to every player and if bid increments are sufficiently small. In that unique equilibrium, bidders immediately reduce their demand to the efficient allocation, and the auction ends in the first round of bidding.

Keywords: Simultaneous Ascending Auction; weak dominance; multi-unit auctions; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin and nep-mic
Date: 2004
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