Sabotaging Potential Rivals

J. Atsu Amegashie and Marco Runkel ()

No CESifo Working Paper No. 1500, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: This paper studies sabotage in a contest with non-identical players. Unlike previous papers, we consider sabotage in an elimination contest and allow contestants to sabotage a potential or future rival. It turns out that for a certain partition of players there is a pure-strategy equilibrium in which only the most able contestant engages in sabotage while less able contestants do not. The most able contestant may therefore prefer a situation where sabotage is allowed to one where sabotage is not allowed. For another partition of players, there is a unique equilibrium in which none of the players invests in sabotage.

Keywords: all-pay auction; elimination contests; potential rival; sabotage (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
Date: 2005
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocCIDL/cesifo1_wp1500.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Sabotaging Potential Rivals (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1500

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich
Address: Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich
Series data maintained by Julio Saavedra ().