Efficient Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection

Alberto Bisin () and Piero Gottardi ()

No CESifo Working Paper No. 1504, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: Do Walrasian markets function orderly in the presence of adverse selection? In particular, is their outcome efficient? This paper addresses these questions in the context of a Rothschild and Stiglitz insurance economy. We identify an externality associated with the presence of adverse selection as a special form of consumption externality. Consequently, we show that while competitive equilibria always exist, they are not typically incentive efficient. However, as markets for pollution rights can internalize environmental externalities, markets for consumption rights can be designed so as to internalize the consumption externality due to adverse selection. With such markets competitive equilibria exist and are always incentive efficient. Moreover, any incentive efficient allocation can be decentralized as a competitive equilibrium.

JEL-codes: D50 D62 D82 G22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fin and nep-mic
Date: 2005
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Journal Article: Efficient Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection (2006)
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