Why is Fiscal Policy often Procyclical?

Alberto Alesina () and Guido Tabellini ()

No CESifo Working Paper No. 1556, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: Many countries, especially developing ones, follow procyclical fiscal policies, namely spending goes up (taxes go down) in booms and spending goes down (taxes go up) in recessions. We provide an explanation for this suboptimal fiscal policy based upon political distortions and incentives for less-than-benevolent government to appropriate rents. Voters have incentives similar to the "starving the Leviathan" classic argument, and demand more public goods or fewer taxes to prevent governments from appropriating rents when the economy is doing well. We test this argument against more traditional explanations based purely on borrowing constraints, with a reasonable amount of success.

JEL-codes: H30 H60 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac, nep-pbe, nep-pol and nep-pub
Date: 2005
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Related works:
Working Paper: Why Is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical? (2005)
Working Paper: Why is fiscal policy often procyclical? (2005)
Working Paper: Why is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical? (2005)
Working Paper: Why is fiscal policy often procyclical? (2005)
Journal Article: Why is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical? (2008)
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