A Model of Income Insurance and Social Norms

Assar Lindbeck and Mats Persson ()

No CESifo Working Paper No. 1675, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: A large literature on ex ante moral hazard in income insurance emphasizes that the individual can affect the probability of an income loss by choice of lifestyle and hence, the degree of risk-taking. The much smaller literature on moral hazard ex post mainly analyzes how a “moral hazard constraint” can make the individual abstain from fraud (“mimicking”). The present paper instead presents a model of moral hazard ex post without a moral hazard constraint; the individual's ability and willingness to work is represented by a continuous stochastic variable in the utility function, and the extent of moral hazard depends on the generosity of the insurance system. Our model is also well suited for analyzing social norms concerning work and benefit dependency.

Keywords: moral hazard; sick pay insurance; labor supply; asymmetric information (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G22 H53 I38 J21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias, nep-ltv, nep-pbe, nep-soc and nep-upt
Date: 2006
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Related works:
Working Paper: A Model of Income Insurance and Social Norms (2006)
Working Paper: A Model of Income Insurance and Social Norms (2006)
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