Job Security and Work Absence: Evidence from a Natural Experiment

Assar Lindbeck, Marten Palme () and Mats Persson ()

No CESifo Working Paper No. 1687, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: We analyze the consequences for sickness absence of a selective softening of job security legislation for small firms in Sweden in 2001. According to our differences-in-difference estimates, aggregate absence in these firms fell by 0.2-0.3 days per year. This aggregate net figure hides important effects on different groups of employees. Workers remaining in the reform firms after the reform reduced their absence by about one day. People with a high absence record tended to leave reform firms, but these firms also became less reluctant to hire people with a record of high absence.

Keywords: seniority rules; sick pay insurance; firing costs; moral hazard (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H53 I38 J22 J50 M51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ias, nep-lab, nep-ltv and nep-pbe
Date: 2006
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Related works:
Working Paper: Job Security and Work Absence: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2006)
Working Paper: Job Security and Work Absence: Evidence from a Natural Experiment (2006)
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