Company Tax Reform in Europe and its Effect on Collusive Behavior

Dirk Schindler () and Guttorm Schjelderup ()

No CESifo Working Paper No. 1702, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: We study how harmonization of corporate tax systems affects the stability of international cartels. We show that tax base harmonization reinforces collusive agreements, while harmonization of corporate tax rates may destabilize or stabilize cartels. We also find that bilateral and full harmonization to a common standard is worse from society’s point of view than unilateral harmonization to a minimum tax standard.

Keywords: corporate tax systems; tacit collusion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H87 L10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-acc, nep-eec and nep-pbe
Date: 2006
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Working Paper: Company Tax Reform in Europe and its Effect on Collusive Behavior (2006)
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