Does Membership on the UN Security Council Influence IMF Decisions? Evidence from Panel Data
Axel Dreher (),
Jan-Egbert Sturm () and
James Vreeland ()
No 1808, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich
We investigate whether temporary members of the UN Security Council receive favorable treatment from the IMF, using panel data for 191 countries over the period 1951 to 2004. Our results indicate a robust positive relationship between temporary UN Security Council membership and participation in IMF programs, even after accounting for economic and political factors, as well as regional and country effects, and duration dependence. There is also evidence that UNSC membership reduces the number of conditions included in IMF programs. The size of the loan, however, is not affected by UNSC membership.
Keywords: IMF; UN Security Council; voting; aid (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F33 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations View citations in EconPapers (12) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cesifo-group.de/portal/page/portal/DocB ... 9/cesifo1_wp1808.pdf (application/pdf)
Working Paper: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence IMF decisions? Evidence from panel data (2007)
Working Paper: Does membership on the UN Security Council influence IMF decisions? Evidence from panel data (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ces:ceswps:_1808
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich Poschingerstrasse 5, 81679 Munich. Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Julio Saavedra ().