Term Limits: Do they really Affect Fiscal Policy Choices?

Chiara Dalle Nogare () and Roberto Ricciuti ()

No CESifo Working Paper No. 2199, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: According to reputational models of political economy, a term limit may change the behavior of a chief executive because he does not have to stand for election. We test this hypothesis in a sample of 52 countries over the period 1977-2000, using government spending, social and welfare spending and deficit as policy choice variables using panel data estimation techniques. We are unable to find significant differences in the behavior of term-limited and non term-limited chief executives. This is in contrast with some previous empirical results based on U.S. states and international data.

Keywords: term limits; comparative politics; fiscal policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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