Efficiency Enhancing Taxation in Two-sided Markets

Hans Jarle Kind (), Marko Koethenbuerger and Guttorm Schjelderup ()

No CESifo Working Paper No. 2262, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: This paper examines the efficient provision of goods in two-sided markets and characterizes optimal specific and ad-valorem taxes. We show that (i) a monopoly may have too high output compared to the social optimum; (ii) output may be reduced by imposing negative value-added taxes (subsidy) or positive specific taxes.

JEL-codes: D40 D43 H21 H22 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Related works:
Working Paper: Efficiency Enhancing Taxation in Two-sided Markets (2008)
Journal Article: Efficiency enhancing taxation in two-sided markets (2008)
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