Non-Tariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization

Simon Anderson () and Nicolas Schmitt ()

No CESifo Working Paper No. 254, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: This paper shows that governments have no incentive to introduce non-tariff barriers when they are free to set tariffs but they do when tariffs are determined cooperatively. We then show three results. First, with trade liberalization, there is a progression from u sing tariffs only to quotas, and to antidumping constraints (when quotas are jointly eliminated). Second, there is a narrowing of the range of industries in which each instrument is used. Third, the degree of tariff liberalization and of replacement of ta riffs by NTBs depend on industry characteristics. These results are roughly in line with the empirical evidence.

Keywords: Tariffs; trade policy; reciprocal dumping; quotas; antidumping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F12 F13 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written
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Related works:
Working Paper: Non-Tariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization (2000)
Working Paper: Non-Tariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization (1997)
Journal Article: Nontariff Barriers and Trade Liberalization (2003)
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