Evolutionary Norm Enforcement

Werner Gueth () and Axel Ockenfels
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Werner Güth ()

No CESifo Working Paper No. 331, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: Applying an indirect evolutionary approach with endogenous preference formation, we show that a legal system can induce players to reward trust even if material incentives dictate to exploit trust. By analyzing the crowding out or crowding in of trustworthiness implied by various verdict rules, we can assess how a court influences the share of kept promises of "truly" trustworthy players who evolutionarily evolved as trustworthy and of opportunistic players who are only trustworthy if inspired by material incentives.

JEL-codes: B40 D80 K00 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Working Paper: Evolutionary Norm Enforcement
Journal Article: Evolutionary Norm Enforcement (2000)
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