Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach

Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock () and de Casper Vries ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Casper G. de Vries ()

No CESifo Working Paper No. 373, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown by the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case. Rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skillful attorneys. This framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under a continuum of legal systems. The British rule, American rule, and some recently proposed legal reforms are special cases of our model.

Keywords: Auctions; contests; litigation; fee-shifting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D80 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Related works:
Working Paper: Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach (2004)
Working Paper: Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach (2000)
Working Paper: Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: an Auction-Theoretic Approach (2000)
Journal Article: Comparative Analysis of Litigation Systems: An Auction-Theoretic Approach (2005)
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