Term Length and the Quality of Appointments

Amihai Glazer and Vesa Kanniainen

No CESifo Working Paper No. 380, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: Consider a principal who appoints an agent. Let the agent potentially serve for a sufficiently long time that one principal is replaced by another over this period. Suppose also that the quality of the agent appointed increases with the effort the incumbent principal devotes to hiring. Then the quality of the appointment may increase with the length of the agent?s term. Moreover, policies such as mandatory retirement which increase a prinicpal?s concern for output after he leaves office, may induce better hiring.

Keywords: Hiring; tenure; quality of appointment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J20 J40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
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Related works:
Working Paper: Term Length and the Quality of Appointments (2000)
Working Paper: Term Length and the Quality of Appointment (2000)
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