Low Price Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany

Veronika Grimm, Frank Riedel () and Elmar Wolfstetter ()

No CESifo Working Paper No. 506, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction.The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending-bid auctions.In particular it is shown that the low price equilibrium that implements the efficient allocation is the unique perfect equilibrium of that game.

Keywords: Multi-unit auctions; spectrum auctions; telecomm-unications; industrial organization; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D45 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Related works:
Working Paper: Low Price Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany
Journal Article: Low price equilibrium in multi-unit auctions: the GSM spectrum auction in Germany (2003)
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