Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in in Multilateral Negotiations

Paola Conconi () and Carlo Perroni

No CESifo Working Paper No. 601, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: We describe a model of international, multidimensional policy coordination where countries can enter into selective and separate agreements with different partners along different policy dimensions. The model is used to examine the implications of negotiation tie-in - the requirement that agreements must span multiple dimensions of interaction - for the viability of multilateral cooperation when countries are linked by international trade flows and transboundary pollution. We show that, while in some cases negotiation tie-in has either no effect or can make multilateral cooperation more viable, in others a formal tie-in constraint can make an otherwise viable joint multilateral agreement unstable.

Keywords: international cooperation; trade and environmental policy negotiations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 F00 F10 Q30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2001
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Related works:
Working Paper: Issue Linkage and Issue Tie-in in Multilateral Negotiations (2000)
Journal Article: Issue linkage and issue tie-in in multilateral negotiations (2002)
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