International Protection of Intellectual Property

Gene Grossman () and Lai, Edwin L.-C.

No CESifo Working Paper No. 790, CESifo Working Paper Series from CESifo Group Munich

Abstract: We study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy. We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size and in their capacities for innovation. We associate the strength of IPR protection with the duration of a country's patents that are applied with national treatment. After describing the determination of national policies in a non-cooperative regime of patent protection, we ask, Why are patents longer in the North? We also study international patent agreements by deriving the properties of an efficient global regime of patent protection and asking whether harmonization of patent policies is necessary or sufficient for global efficiency.

Keywords: patents; intellectual property; harmonization; TRIPs. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Related works:
Working Paper: International Protection of Intellectual Property (2002)
Working Paper: International Protection of intellectual Property (2001)
Working Paper: International Protection of Intellectual Property (2002)
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