Self Enforced Mechanisms of Corporate Governance: Evidence from Managerial Turnover in Russia

Andrei Alexandrovich Rachinsky

No w0051, Working Papers from Center for Economic and Financial Research (CEFIR)

Abstract: Managerial entrenchment, an undeveloped market for top managerial labor force and the absence of clear market signals could prevent owners from firing management for poor performance. Top managerial turnover could improve firms’ performance by introducing new human capital and providing good incentives for a new manager if the previous CEO has been fired for poor performance. We evaluate the effectiveness of selfenforced corporate governance mechanisms by determining the causes of top management turnover and estimating consequences of management turnover on the subsequent corporate performance. We track all turnovers of CEO’s in the 110 largest Russian companies during a five year period (from 1997 to 2001) and classify each case of turnover according to the new position of the prior CEO and the origin of the new director.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cis and nep-tra
Date: 2005-10
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