Fooling the Nice Guys: The effect of lying about contributions on public good provision and punishment
Bernd Irlenbusch and
Janna Ter Meer
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Bernd Irlenbusch: University of Cologne
Janna Ter Meer: University of Cologne
No 03-11, Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series from Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences
Our study takes an individual perspective on receiver credulity in a public good setting with deceptive messages. In a laboratory experiment, subjects play a public good game with punishment in which feedback on actual contributions is obscured. Instead, subjects can communicate what they have contributed through a post-hoc announcement mechanism. Using subject's social value orientation, we show that those highest on the measure are too optimistic towards announcements of their fellow group members. This, in turn, influences payoff-relevant decisions: those high on social value orientation contribute more to the public good and punish their fellow group members less.
Keywords: public goods; punishment; lying; receiver credulity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D03 H41 D02 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-pbe and nep-soc
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cgr:cgsser:03-11
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