The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals
Thorn Kring and
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Torsten Biemann: University of Cologne
Thorn Kring: Steinbeis University of Berlin
No 03-13, Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series from Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences
In an experiment with professionals from the financial services sector, we investigate the impact of a team incentive scheme on recommendation quality of investment products when advisors benefit from advising lower quality products. Experimental results reveal that, when group affiliation is strong, worse products are recommended significantly more often under team incentives than under individual incentives.
Keywords: deception; team incentives; professionals; financial advice; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D82 J30 M52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cta, nep-exp and nep-hrm
Date: 2012-10-15, Revised 2012-12-18
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http://www.cgs.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso_fak/cgs ... aper/cgswp_03-13.pdf Version October 2012 (application/pdf)
http://www.cgs.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso_fak/cgs ... /cgswp_03-13-rev.pdf Revised version December 2012 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals (2013)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cgr:cgsser:03-13
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