(Public) Good Examples - On the Role of Limited Feedback in Voluntary Contribution Games
Bernd Irlenbusch and
Rainer Rilke ()
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Bernd Irlenbusch: University of Cologne
No 04-04, Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series from Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences
This paper experimentally investigates into the effects of limited feedback on contributions in a repeated public goods game. We test whether feedback about good examples (i.e., the respective maximum contribution in a period) in contrast to bad examples (i.e., the minimum contributions) induces higher contributions. When the selection of feedback is non-transparent to the subjects, good examples boost cooperation while bad examples hamper them. No significant differences are observed between providing good or bad examples, when the feedback selection rule is transparent. Our results shed new light on how to design feedback provision in public goods settings.
Keywords: Public Goods; Feedback; Imperfect Conditional Cooperation; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H41 C92 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-cta, nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-pub
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cgr:cgsser:04-04
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