"Read my Lips!" Experimental Evidence on the Effects of Electoral Competition on Shirking and Trust
Gari Walkowitz and
Arne R. Weiss
Additional contact information
Gari Walkowitz: University of Cologne
Arne R. Weiss: University of Cologne
No 05-07, Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series from Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences
We experimentally test whether electoral competition reduces shirking behavior by office-holders and increases citizens' trust. We hypothesize that competition increases campaign promises by office-holders, who feel committed to what they promise. Using a novel repeated multi-person investment-game with periodic elections, we indeed find that elected office-holders shirk less (i.e., they back-transfer more to citizens relative to investments) as compared to randomly appointed office-holders. Surprisingly, this effect cannot be explained through competition inflating the level of electoral promises. Nevertheless, promises do matter; in fact, they carry greater weight for the behavior of elected office-holders than for their randomly appointed counterparts. Elections also have a positive short-term effect on citizens' trust by cutting off both low and excessively high promises.
Keywords: elections; promises; shirking; trust game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D02 D03 C71 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-pol and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://www.cgs.uni-koeln.de/fileadmin/wiso_fak/cgs ... aper/cgswp_05-07.pdf (application/pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cgr:cgsser:05-07
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Cologne Graduate School Working Paper Series from Cologne Graduate School in Management, Economics and Social Sciences Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by David Kusterer ().