The incentive effects of payment by results

Marisa Miraldo (), Maria Goddard and Peter Smith ()
Additional contact information
Maria Goddard: Centre for Health Economics, University of York
Peter Smith: Centre for Health Economics, University of York

No 019cherp, Working Papers from Centre for Health Economics, University of York

Abstract: Recently the English NHS has introduced an activity-based payment scheme for secondary care - the Payment by Results (PbR) policy. In this paper we discuss, from an economic perspective, the main intended and unintended incentives created by this policy. We also outline the role of different NHS institutions in monitoring and analysing the impact of PbR and consider the information and data requirements for such tasks.

Date: 2006-10
View citations in EconPapers

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.york.ac.uk/inst/che/pdf/rp19.pdf First version, 2006 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:chy:respap:19cherp

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from Centre for Health Economics, University of York
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Frances Sharp ().