Would Rational Voters Acquire Costly Information?

Cesar Martinelli ()

No 210, Working Papers from Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM

Abstract: We analyze an election in which voters are uncertain about which of two alternatives is better for them. Voters can, however, acquire some costly information about the alternatives. As the number of voters increases, individual investment in political information declines to zero. However, the election outcome is likely to correspond to the interest of the majority if the marginal cost of information acquisition approaches zero as the information acquired becomes nearly irrelevant. Under certain conditions, the election outcome corresponds to the interests of the majority with probability approaching one. Thus, "rationally ignorant" voters are consistent with a well-informed electorate. JEL D72, D82. Keywords: voting, information acquisition, information aggregation.

Keywords: voting; information acquisition; information aggregation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-11
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Related works:
Working Paper: Would Rational Voters Acquire Costly Information? (2004)
Journal Article: Would rational voters acquire costly information? (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cie:wpaper:0210

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