Anonymity in Large Societies

Andrei Gomberg, Cesar Martinelli () and Ricard Torres
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Ricard Torres: Centro de Investigacion Economica (CIE), Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico (ITAM), Universitat de Girona

No 211, Working Papers from Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM

Abstract: In a social choice model with an infinite number of agents, there may occur "equal size" coalitions that a preference aggregation rule should treat in the same manner. We introduce an axiom of equal treatment with respect to a measure of coalition size and explore its interaction with common axioms of social choice. We show that, provided the measure space is sufficiently rich in coalitions of the same measure, the new axiom is the natural extension of the concept of anonymity, and in particular plays a similar role in the characterization of preference aggregation rules.

JEL-codes: D71 C69 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: Written
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http://ftp.itam.mx/pub/academico/inves/martinelli/02-11.pdf First version, 2002 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Anonymity in large societies (2005)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cie:wpaper:0211

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