Elections as Targeting Contests

Cesar Martinelli ()

No 601, Working Papers from Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM

Abstract: This paper develops a model of electoral turnout where parties compensate voters for showing up to the polls. Existence and uniqueness conditions are shown to impose substantial restrictions on the uncertainty about partisan support faced by the parties, and on the distribution of voting costs among citizens. The model predicts that voters in the minority will be more likely to vote, and that turnout increases with the importance of the election. The model can generate the observed correlation between election closeness and electoral turnout, lthough the cause of this correlation may depend on the distribution of voting costs.

Keywords: Elections (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006-03, Revised 2006-03
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http://ftp.itam.mx/pub/academico/inves/martinelli/06-01.pdf First version, 2005-07-26 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Elections as Targeting Contests (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cie:wpaper:0601

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