On Bid Disclosure in OCS Wildcat Auctions

Nicolas Melissas ()

No 905, Working Papers from Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM

Abstract: I study a game in which two players first bid for offshore tracts (below which oil and gas may be present) and next time their drilling decisions. High types bid more aggressively if the auctioneer discloses bids as this gives them useful information about the profitability of drilling. A low type fears that the disclosure of her "low" bid reduces the other player's incentive to drill. Hence, they bid more aggressively if the auctioneer does not disclose bids. If players are sufficiently patient, it is optimal to disclose bids. Otherwise, it may be optimal not to disclose them.

Keywords: Information Externality; Oil Exploration; Waiting; War of attrition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 C72 Q49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dge and nep-upt
Date: 2009
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cie:wpaper:0905

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