Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious

Dominique Demougin () and Claude Fluet ()

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: We compare the wage costs of providing incentives through group versus individual bonus schemes. When workers are envious, either scheme may be the least cost one owing to the trade-off between the dissatisfaction with the prospect of unequal pay and the incentives it generates

Nous comparons les coûts salariaux des rémunérations incitatives par bonus de groupe et par bonus individuels. Quand les travailleurs ont une propension à l'envie, l'un ou l'autre de ces modes de rémunération peut s'avérer le moins coûteux étant donné l'arbitrage entre l'insatisfaction associée aux inégalités salariales et les incitations à l'effort qu'elles engendrent.

Keywords: Bonus; Efficiency Wage; Envy; Fairness; Incentives; Bonus; salaire d'efficience; envie; équité; incitations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 J4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-04-01
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Working Paper: Group vs. Individual Performance Pay When Workers Are Envious (2003)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2003s-10

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