Deterrence vs Judicial Error: A Comparative View of Standards of Proof

Dominique Demougin () and Claude Fluet ()

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: We argue that the common law standard of proof, given the rules of evidence, does not minimize expected error as usually argued in the legal literature, but may well be efficient from the standpoint of providing maximal incentives for socially desirable behavior. By contrast, civil law's higher but somewhat imprecise standard may be interpreted as reflecting a tradeoff between providing incentives and avoiding judicial error per se. In our model, the optimal judicial system has rules resembling those in the common law when providing incentives is paramount. When greater weight is given to avoiding error, the optimal system has civilian features.

Nous argumentons que le standard de preuve en common law, compte tenu des contraintes de recevabilité en matière de preuve, n'a pas pour effet de minimiser l'erreur attendue comme le soutient la littérature juridique, mais qu'il peut être efficient d'un point de vue incitatif. Par comparaison, le standard de preuve plus fort mais imprécis des pays de droit codifié peut s'interpréter comme résultant d'un arbitrage entre minimisation des erreurs et effets incitatifs. Dans notre modèle, le système légal optimal a des règles ressemblant à celle de la common law quand les préoccupations incitatives sont primordiales. Lorsqu'une plus grande importance est attachée à l'élimination des erreurs de justice, le système optimal a des caractéristiques proches des systèmes de droit codifié.

Keywords: standard of proof; burden of proof; common law; civil law; evidentiary; standard de preuve; charge de la preuve; common law; droit civil; règles de preuve (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004-07-01
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Working Paper: Deterrence vs Judicial Error: a Comparative View of Standards of Proof (2004)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2004s-38

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