Input Price Discrimination, Access Pricing, and Bypass

Ngo Van Long and Antoine Soubeyran ()

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: This paper explores several aspects of the vertical relationship between an upstream firm and a number of downstream firms that are Cournot rivals relying on the inputs provided by the upstream firm. We address the following questions: (i) if the upstream firm can charge different prices to different downstream firms, will it charge higher prices to more efficient firms? (ii) if the upstream firm can provide different levels of quality of access to several ex ante identical downstream firms, will it provide a uniform quality of access? The answer to (i) depends on whether downstream firms can self-supply. As for (ii), we show that equals may be treated unequally.

Nous examinons le problème des relations verticales. Quand un fournisseur discrimine, est-ce qu'il impose aux firmes à coût marginal plus bas un prix de l'input plus haut que celui qu'il impose aux firmes à coût marginal plus haut? Nous montrons que cela dépend de la capacité des firmes aval à partiellement produire l'input. Nous fournissons aussi une formule de charge d'accès dans le cas où les firmes aval sont des compétiteurs à la Cournot non identiques. Finalement, nous développons un modèle de discrimination par la qualité d'un input, et nous montrons que la firme amont peut trouver profitable de traiter différemment des firmes identiques.

Keywords: Input price; discount; self-supply; Prix d'un input; remises; intégration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999-06-01
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:99s-23

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