Abstract:
The working definition of accountability of the regional government draws on the broader definition, provided by Schmitter, accountability being ‘a relationship between two sets of actors, in which the former accepts to inform the other, explain or justify his or her action and submit to any pre-determined that the latter may impose (2004, 5) implies an interaction between it and population. It describes not only the obligation of that government for explanation and justification of their use of delegated power, but also implies that the population is capable, using certain instruments and under certain conditions, of holding it accountable. Governments are accountable if their electorate has sufficient powers and means of discerning the responsive/unaccountable performance and sanctioning or rewarding them accordingly, in other words, if the performance of politicians influences their chances of being re-elected. Electoral accountability is better achieved over relatively long time spans, containing at least one but ideally several electoral terms. Over this period we may observe whether ‘bad’ politicians are detected by the citizens and voted out of the office, while ‘good’ ones are re-elected. Such a pattern will suggest that this particular government is accountable via elections to its constituents.
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