The paper will be divided into four parts. The first section will assess on the weak state structure that shaped the national preference formation in Italy and thus introducing better the subsequent sections: the political actor’s preference formation during the negotiation of the euro and the special case of Confindustria as the representative of the specific economic sectors. In effect, it will be focus on this logic of the major domestic actors that have either fostered or constrained the implementation of the single currency before and during the cycle 2002-2005. Nonetheless, such theory will be complemented by the analytical framework provided by Quagli and Dyson who define the state structure dimension through institutions and ideas. Put simply, the theoretical approach of the paper consists of combining the elements of the national preferences formation and the values that supported them in a pre-defined and unique state structure’s configuration. The fourth section, in turn, will move to the final evaluation of the Berlusconi’s government that confirms the validity of the above mention hypothesis. To conclude, it will be summarize the axial arguments presented throughout the previous sections and it will be explained the potential perspectives in the next five years.