The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge in Two Player Games

Drew Fudenberg and David K Levine

Levine's Working Paper Archive from David K. Levine

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2004-06-04
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Related works:
Working Paper: The Nash Threats Folk Theorem With Communication and Approximate Common Knowledge In Two Player Games (2002)
Journal Article: The Nash-threats folk theorem with communication and approximate common knowledge in two player games (2007)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cla:levarc:618897000000000030

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