Why do Politicians Delegate?

Alberto Alesina () and Guido Tabellini ()

Levine's Bibliography from UCLA Department of Economics

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
Date: Written 2005-10-06
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Related works:
Working Paper: Why do Politicians Delegate? (2005)
Working Paper: Why Do Politicians Delegate? (2005)
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