Consensus and the Accuracy of Signals: Optimal Committee Design with Endogenous Information

Nicola Persico

Penn CARESS Working Papers from Penn Economics Department

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Working Paper: Consensus and the Accuracy of Signals: Optimal Committee Design with Endogenous Information'
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