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Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Candidates

John Duggan

Theory workshop papers from UCLA Department of Economics

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pub
Date: 2003-03-06
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http://www.econ.ucla.edu/iobara/seminarW03/feb03part1.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates (2007) Downloads
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