The Effect of Incentive Structure on Heuristic Decision Making: The Proportion Heuristic

Robert J. Oxoby ()

No 2007-10, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Calgary

Abstract: When making judgments, individuals often utilize heuristics to interpret information. We report on a series of experiments designed to test the ways in which incentive mechanisms influence the use of a particular heuristic in decision-making. Specifically, we demonstrate how information regarding the number of available practice problems influences the behaviors of individuals preparing for an exam (the proportion heuristic). More importantly the extent to which this information infleunces behavior depends critically on the way in which performance incentives are structured. In particular, relative compensation schemes magnify the influence of this heuristic while joint compensation schemes dampen its influence. We discuss these results with respect to the literature on effective compensation.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
Date: 2007-10-26, Revised 2007-10-26
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Working Paper: The Effect of Incentive Structure on Heuristic Decision Making: The Proportion Heuristic (2007)
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