Dynamic Common Agency, Vertical Integration, and Investment: The Economics of Movie Distribution

Darren Filson ()

Claremont Colleges Working Papers from Claremont Colleges

Abstract: This paper analyzes the impact of vertical integration on investment and other strategies in a dynamic common agency framework. Movie distribution is used as a motivating example. The model matches several facts about movie distribution; distributors avoid head-to-head new hit releases, hits have longer runs than flops, and distributors receive the lion’s share of value generated by hits. Welfare comparisons show that integration is privately profitable and may improve social welfare even though it reduces industry profits. The e.ects of integration on strategies and welfare depend critically on how integration a.ects the bargaining power of the non-integrated firm.

Keywords: common agency; exclusive dealing; entertainment; film; licensing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L14 L22 L82 C61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul
Date: 2003-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.claremontmckenna.edu/rdschool/papers/2003-07.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:clm:clmeco:2003-07

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Claremont Colleges Working Papers from Claremont Colleges
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by ().