A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets

Federico Echenique () and Jorge Oviedo

No 1185, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Abstract: We develop a theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets. We give conditions under which the setwise-stable set, a core-like concept, is nonempty and can be approached through an algorithm. The setwise-stable set coincides with the pairwise-stable set, and with the predictions of a non-cooperative bargaining model. The set-wise stable set possesses the canonical conflict/coincidence of interest properties from many-to-one, and one-to-one models. The theory parallels the standard theory of stability for many-to-one, and one-to-one, models. We provide results for a number of core-like solutions, besides the setwise-stable set.

Keywords: matching markets; core; lattice; stability; substitutability; Tarski's fixed point theoryem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003-11
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Published: Published in Theoretical Economics 1 (2006) 233-273.

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Related works:
Working Paper: A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets (2004)
Working Paper: A Theory of Stability in Many-to-Many Matching Markets (2005)
Working Paper: A Theory of Stability in Many-to-many Matching Markets (2003)
Journal Article: A theory of stability in many-to-many matching markets (2006)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:clt:sswopa:1185

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