An explanation of inefficient redistribution: Transfers insure cohesive groups

Federico Echenique () and Jon X Eguia ()

No 1234, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Keywords: inefficient redistribution; cohesion; insurance; sectoral subsidies; trade policy; collective action (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Date: 2005-08
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Forthcoming in Quarterly Journal of Political Science

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