Non-Existence of Equilibrium in Vickrey, Second-Price, and English Auctions

Matthew O. Jackson ()

No 1241, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Abstract: A simple example shows that equilibria can fail to exist in second price (Vickrey) and English auctions when there are both common and private components to bidders' valuations and private information is held on both dimensions. The example shows that equilibrium only exists in the extremes of pure private and pure common values, and that existence in standard models is not robust to a slight perturbation.

Keywords: general equilibrium; stability; experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
Date: 2005-11

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Related works:
Journal Article: Non-existence of equilibrium in Vickrey, second-price, and English auctions (2009)
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