The case for auctioning countermeasures in the WTO

Petros C. Mavroidis (), Kyle Bagwell and Robert W. Staiger ()
Additional contact information
Petros C. Mavroidis: Columbia University - Columbia Law School

No 0405-08, Discussion Papers from Columbia University, Department of Economics

Abstract: A major accomplishment of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations in creating the World Trade Organization (WTO) was the introduction of new dispute settlement procedures. These procedures were intended to provide a significant step forward, relative to GATT, in the settling of trade disputes, in large part by ensuring that violations of WTO commitments would be met with swift retaliation ("suspension of concessions") by the affected trading partners. While the dispute settlement procedures of the WTO indeed represent a considerable improvement over those in GATT, nine years of experience under the new procedures suggests that significant problems of enforcement remain in the WTO.

Date: Written
View list of references

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.columbia.edu/RePEc/pdf/DP0405-08.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: The Case for Auctioning Countermeasures in the WTO (2003)
Working Paper: The case for auctioning countermeasures in the WTO (2003)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:clu:wpaper:0405-08

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers from Columbia University, Department of Economics
Contact information at EDIRC.
Series data maintained by Discussion Paper Coordinator ().