Cores of non-atomic market games

Massimiliano Amarante (), F. Maccheroni (), Massimo Marinacci and Luigi Montrucchio
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Massimiliano Amarante: Department of Economics, Columbia University
F. Maccheroni: Universita Bocconi - Istituto di Metodi Quantitativi

No 0506-10, Discussion Papers from Columbia University, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooperative games introduced by Aumann and Shapley [2], and, more in general, of those games that admit a na-continuous and concave extension to the set of ideal coalitions, studied by Einy, Moreno, and Shitovitz [12]. We show that the core of such games is norm compact and we provide some representation results. We also give a Multiple Priors interpretation of some of our results.We study the cores of non-atomic market games, a class of transferable utility cooperative.

Date: 2005
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Related works:
Working Paper: Cores of Non-Atomic Market Games (2006)
Journal Article: Cores of non-atomic market games (2006)
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