Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment

James Andreoni (), Yeon-Koo Che () and Jinwoo Kim ()
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Jinwoo Kim: Yonsei University

No 0506-27, Discussion Papers from Columbia University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper studies experimentally how information about rivals' types affects bidding behavior in first- and second-price auctions. The comparative static hypotheses associated with information about rivals enables us to test the relevance of such information as well as the general predictions of the auction theory, by providing an effective means to control for risk aversion and other behavioral motives that were difficult to control for in previous experiments. Our experimental evidence provides strong support for the theory, and sheds light on the roles of risk aversion and the spite motive in first- and second-price auctions, respectively.

Date: 2006
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http://www.econ.columbia.edu/RePEc/pdf/DP0506-27.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment (2005)
Working Paper: Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: an experiment (2006)
Working Paper: Asymmetric Information about Rivals’ Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment (2006)
Journal Article: Asymmetric information about rivals' types in standard auctions: An experiment (2007)
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