Market Arbitrage, Social Choice and the Core

Graciela Chichilnisky ()

Discussion Papers from Columbia University, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper establishes a clear connection between equilibrium theory, game theory and social choice theory by showing that, for a well defined social choice problem, a condition which is necessary and sufficient to solve this problem - limited arbitrage - is the same as the condition which is necessary and sufficient to establish the existence of an equilibrium and the core.

Keywords: GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM; SOCIAL POLICY (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D50 C7 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1996

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Journal Article: Market arbitrage, social choice and the core (1997)
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Persistent link: http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:clu:wpaper:1996_31

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